Bush’s policy of “compassionate conservatism” is extremely important to the President because it allows him to portray himself as a moderate politician who is concerned about the average citizen. Bush 41, whose core political beliefs were very similar to Bush 43’s, suffered from not being seen as sufficiently populist, and ultimately lost reelection because of this. The current President Bush has learned from his father’s mistakes, and has sought to put forth a kinder gentler George Bush than his father did. As part of this strategy, “compassionate conservatism” was much in evidence in Bush's most recent State of the Union speech. However, although Bush wants to be perceived as a man of the people, he doesn’t want to actually have to follow through on any of his proposals, which leads him to make grand-sounding promises that he later finds ways to renege on. The biggest example is the wave of corporate scandals that wracked the nation last year. Bush pledged to go after the corporate criminals and reform the accounting industry, but after the public and press stopped paying attention to the issue, he took back many of his promises. Now Bush is up to the same tricks again, as the following clip from Slate’s
Today’s Papers shows.
A NYT editorial notices that Bush's proposed budget suggests he's not exactly racing to deliver on his promise of increased AIDS funding in Africa. In his State of the Union address, the president pledged $10 billion over five years; the proposed '04 budget only includes a $550 million increase. Oh, and most of that cash is balanced by cuts in international health-care programs for kids.
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Thomas Friedman’s
February 16 editorial in the
NY Times is the kind of essay by a public intellectual that has the capacity to shape how this period in history is seen now and in the future. What makes this essay historic is Friedman’s identification of order and disorder as the defining political division in the world today, replacing earlier divisions such as capitalism/communism and democracy/totalitarianism.
The new world system is also bipolar, but instead of being divided between East and West, it is divided between the World of Order and the World of Disorder. The World of Order is built on four pillars: the U.S., E.U.-Russia, India and China, along with all the smaller powers around them. The World of Disorder comprises failed states (such as Liberia), rogue states (Iraq and North Korea), messy states — states that are too big to fail but too messy to work (Pakistan, Colombia, Indonesia, many Arab and African states) — and finally the terrorist and mafia networks that feed off the World of Disorder.
In other words, divisions between different economic (communism vs. capitalism) and political (democracy vs. totalitarianism) systems are no longer the key divisions in global relations. This is because a) there is no longer any viable, globally led alternative to democratic capitalism, and b) since there is no longer a bipolar economic/political world order, countries can form alliances with countries that don’t have the same economic and political structures they do without setting off major ideological conflicts. Thus, the U.S. can form an alliance with China, even though China is still non-democratic and (nominally) communist. What makes Friedman’s analysis insightful is that he identifies the order/disorder polarity as the replacement for the old divisions of democracy/totalitarianism and capitalism/communism. China and the U.S. have in common that they are both operational states governed (mostly) by the rule of law. Thus, they have interests in common as orderly states, and in this era of ideological leveling, the commonality of interests based on having an orderly society is dominant.
While the implosion of the USSR and the subsequent collapse of a global opposition to democracy and capitalism is a very positive development, there is also a downside to it, and that is that order is not the same thing as good government. We have to be careful that we do not fall into complacent acceptance of and support for order for the sake of order. We can’t support a regime simply because it represents order. That doesn’t mean that we can’t work with such a regime, we just can’t lose track of the distinction between the two. Despite this drawback, however, overall the position of both the U.S. and the world as a whole is superior to what it was during the Cold War.
While Friedman’s analysis of the current world situation is an instant classic, his analysis of the vicissitudes of America’s relationship with the world is misguided and short-sighted. Friedman writes:
[S]ome Chinese intellectuals, not to mention French and Russian, actually believe you all have more to fear from American power than from Osama, Kim or Saddam. That's nuts. If America has to manage the World of Disorder alone, the American people will quickly tire. And as Michael Mandelbaum, the Johns Hopkins foreign policy expert, notes, "The real threat to world stability is not too much American power. It is too little American power." Too little American power will only lead to the World of Disorder expanding.
In other words, the rest of the world is either with us or against us. America is the lesser of two evils, so the rest of the world has an obligation – not an option, an obligation – to choose us. The onus is on them. We are better than terrorists, so we don’t have to change anything we do or engage in any self-criticism or self-analysis. Of course, this logic cuts both ways. The Europeans are better than terrorists, so by the same logic we should accept them as they are, warts and all, and not complain about anything they do. The truth is that, while America is better than terrorism, our foreign policy and our relationship with the world community could be better, and there are concrete changes in our policies and patterns of communication that could improve them, which it is sheer irresponsibility and self-destructiveness on our part to ignore. It’s okay for the U.S. to direct constructive criticism towards Europe, but it’s foolish and hypocritical not to direct – and, further, to declare as unpatriotic – any criticism of our own policies and decisions.
That said, it should be noted that the above criticisms apply to Friedman’s article this week. In
his article the week before (February 12), he said the following.
The first rule of any Iraq invasion is the pottery store rule: You break it, you own it. We break Iraq, we own Iraq — and we own the primary responsibility for rebuilding a country of 23 million people that has more in common with Yugoslavia than with any other Arab nation. I am among those who believe this is a job worth doing, both for what it could do to liberate Iraqis from a terrible tyranny and to stimulate reform elsewhere in the Arab world.
We don't need a broad coalition to break Iraq. We can do that ourselves. But we do need a broad coalition to rebuild Iraq, so that the American taxpayer and Army do not have to bear that full burden or be exposed alone at the heart of the Arab-Muslim world. President Bush, if he alienates the allies from going to war — the part we can do alone — is depriving himself of allies for the peace — the part where we'll need all the friends we can get.
France, China and Russia have to get serious, but so do we. The Bush talk that we can fight this war with just a "coalition of the willing" — meaning Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia — is dangerous nonsense.
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President Bush has made a habit of blocking or pulling out of treaties that form the backbone of the international community. A partial list of treaties the U.S. has discarded and decisions it has made unilaterally includes the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Kyoto Accords, tariffs on steel imports, farm subsidies, and HIV and population control measures in Africa. Now the Bush administration has added another notch to its belt of infamy. As
reported in The Economist:
In November, trade ministers meeting in Sydney appeared to come close to resolving the tricky question of poor countries’ access to new medicines. Many modern drugs are simply too expensive for developing countries and the search has been on for a formula that would provide such medicines to them at much-reduced prices—provided some watertight arrangement preventing their profitable resale in the industrial world could be agreed. Yet in subsequent meetings, America has continued to block a deal acceptable to everyone else.